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1  Introduction
In the 1990s, before South Africa entered the
democracy which was born with the adoption of the
Interim Constitution and an-all party settlement in 1994,
the world press had highlighted the ‘Zulu Boy’ story. To
recapitulate, the central question in the case was
whether or not it was in the interests of a nine-year-old
South African boy to remain in the United Kingdom with
foster parents, or to be returned to his biological – Zulu
– South African family. The child had been brought to
England in 1992 when the child was 18 months old, by
the foster mother, a former employer of the child’s
mother (who was her domestic worker). The parents had
consented to the removal on the basis that it would
benefit the child’s education; however, the parents
launched proceedings two years later to have the child
returned, upon discovering that the foster mother had
commenced adoption proceedings in the United
Kingdom. The substantive hearing took place when the
child had already been in England for some years (four),
and in the care of the foster mother for even longer.
Giving judgment,1 Lord Justice Neill said that the child
had the right to be reunited with his Zulu parents and
with his extended family in South Africa.  
The conflicts in this case were sharply drawn between
the interests of prospective adoptive parents versus the
interests of biological parents; the views of the child who
had stated that he did not wish to return to South Africa,
versus the views of his biological parents; between
culture and biology on the one hand and nurture on the
other. But in a clear allusion to the importance of culture,
the Court was swayed by the child’s primary cultural
background:
‘the child’s development must be, in the last
resort and profoundly, Zulu development and
not Afrikaans or English development’2. 
Reports have it that the return order was not
successful and that the child did not settle in South Africa
and that after six months in South Africa, he had
returned to England with his biological parents’ consent.3
When this case was decided, 16 years ago, race was
the dominant criterion for much welfare-related decision
making in South Africa, although it was wrapped up in
cultural packaging for most of the time.4 So what has
changed, if anything? Do culture, language and religion
play a role, definitive or otherwise, in international
relocation decisions in contemporary South Africa? It is
quite clear that the applicable standard for adjudication
is the best interests of the child,5 that this standard has
differential application from case to case and from one
set of facts to the next. What we seek to examine is
whether the peculiarities of South Africa, as highlighted
by factors such as culture, language and religion are in
any way at stake, and to what extent these three factors
are considered in determining the best interests of the
child in relocation decisions. 
Cultural and religious rights are for many largely
communal in nature, a means of expressing a common
sense of identity, values and traditions.6 As a result of
South Africa’s multi-cultural and linguistic framework,
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culture, language, and religion are constitutionally
protected7 and in practice remain hotly contested - for
example, in the educational context with respect to the
language policies of South African schools.8
The first part of this article turns to culture, language
and religion as constitutional constructs in South Africa,
in an attempt to clarify their importance generally. The
position prior to the Children’s Act9 will then briefly be
discussed. Thereafter, the article will review available
case material, and legal criteria and practical trends will
be drawn from this. Finally, the threads drawn from this
will be pulled together in attempting to provide some
insight into contemporary judicial views in South Africa
on the influence of culture, language and religion in the
field of relocation disputes.
2   The importance of the constitutional
rights to culture, language and religion
In terms of section 15 (1) of the South African
Constitution everyone has the right to freedom of
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, which
includes the right to have a belief; to express that belief
publicly; and to manifest that belief by worship and
practice, teaching and dissemination.10
Section 30 of the Constitution provides that everyone
has the right to use the language and to participate in
the cultural life of their choice, provided that the exercise
of such rights is not in conflict with provisions in the Bill
of Rights.  In terms of section 29 (2) everyone has the
right to receive education in the official language or
languages of their choice11 in public educational
institutions where that education is reasonably
practicable. 
Section 31 (1) provides that persons belonging to a
cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be
denied, with other members of that community the right
to (a) enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use
their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain
cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other
organs of civil society.  
The notion of culture remains a contested concept as
a result of its many possible multi-layered and context-
dependant meanings.12 However, as a general concept,
culture ensures that group identity is protected so that
one cultural group can be distinguished from another.13
Cultural identity has been held as being one of the most
important parts of a person’s identity as it flows from
belonging to a community.14
Cultural rights are also dependent on the right to
education, thus, the right to participate in cultural life is
linked to the right to education, which it is argued, can
only be meaningfully exercised once a certain minimum
level of education has been achieved.15 In addition,
cognitive development expands from social interaction
and is directly influenced by culture.  The extent and
degree of one’s social development are both arguably
also determined by one’s cultural background and
identity.16
7 See section 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1998 (hereafter the Constitution), which is based on Article 27 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 which provide “In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language” I. Currie and J. de Waal (note 6 above) at p623; see also J.D. van der Vyver
‘Cultural identity as a constitutional right in South Africa’ [2003] Stell LR 51 at p52 where the author states that ‘these provisions were intended
to afford constitutional sanction to the international norm proclaiming the right to self-determination of the cultural, religious and linguistic
communities within the body politic’.
8 See Minister of Education, Western Cape v Governing Body, Mikro Primary School 2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA); MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay
2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); M.H. Smit ‘Language rights and the best interests of the child’ [2008] 71 THRHR 38.
9 38 of 2005. Hereafter the ‘Children’s Act’.
10 I.Currie and J. de Waal (note 6 above) at p339. 
11 It should however be noted that the right only applies to the 11 officially recognised languages and not all languages (such as various San
languages). The right also does not provide for a right to mother-tongue education, as the right is subject to the limitation provision that education
in the preferred language must be reasonably practicable see R. Malherbe ‘The constitutional dimension of the best interests of the child in
education’ [2008] TSAR 267 at p 283.
12 A.A. du Plessis and C. Rautenbach ‘Legal perspectives on the role of culture in sustainable development’ [2010] PER 27 at p30.
13 T.W. Bennet and C.H. Powell ‘Restoring land: The claims of Aboriginal title, customary law and the right to culture’ [2005] Stell LR 431 at p 441. 
14 MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) 493D.
15 B. Bekink and M. Bekink ‘Children with disabilities and the right to education: a call for action’ [2005] Stell LR 125.
16 Du Plessis and Rautenbach (note 12 above) 40-41.
– Journal of Family Law and Practice • Vol. 1.2 • Autumn 2010 • page 88 –
In what is regarded as the leading case on the right to
religion, coincidently involving a child, MEC for Education,
Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay,17 the South African Constitutional
Court, without attempting to provide definitions for
culture and religion said:
religion is ordinarily concerned with personal
faith and belief, while culture generally relates
to traditions and beliefs developed by a
community. However, there will often be a
great deal of overlap between the two: religious
practices are frequently informed not only by
faith but also by custom, while cultural beliefs
do not develop in a vacuum and may be based
on the community’s underlying religious or
spiritual beliefs. Therefore, while it is possible
for a belief or practice to be purely religious or
purely cultural, it is equally possible for it to be
both religious and cultural.18
Religion is said to play a significant role in ‘believers’’
lives and in their search for life’s ultimate meaning.
Furthermore, it is a source of identity that is closely
connected to self-respect and dignity, as well as moral
values.19 Religious rights also impact on the right to
education, as section 15 (2) of the Constitution provides
that religious observances may be conducted at state or
state-aided institutions.20
Language is critical for cognitive development as it
provides the concepts for thinking and therefore a means
for expressing ideas. Language is also considered to be
both a precondition for thought and a bearer of thought,
and ultimately influences the extent to which a child’s
intelligence is actualized. Furthermore, we use words to
construct our interpretation of experience; our
experiences shape our language; and in the culture of
schools, a concept does not exist until it has been named
and its meaning shared with others. Language also
enables learners to interact with more capable peers and
adults (including parents) and later with written material
which allows them to share their accumulated
knowledge. Since all teaching is given through the
medium of language, language and education are
interrelated.21
3  The position before the Children’s Act
Prior to the Children’s Act commencement, relocation
applications by the primary caregiver were generally
granted by the courts.22 The approach adopted in the
older cases was that the primary caregiver had the right
to decide where the child should live, unless the non-
primary caregiver could demonstrate that the proposed
relocation would be detrimental to the child. Although
the interests of children were taken into account, they
were not central to the inquiry. Instead, the rights of the
primary caregiver were seen as being paramount23.  This
approach was later rejected, and the paramount
consideration in relocation disputes became the ‘best
interests of the child’ principle.24 This standard was,
nevertheless, applied in a rather vague and general way,
with no guidelines or list of factors to assist the courts;
the result was different outcomes on whether or not
relocation should be allowed.25 Although the standard
eventually became a constitutional imperative,26 the
Constitution, too, did not provide guidance on how the
best interests of the child should play a role, other than
to provide that these interests should be of paramount
concern.
Broadly speaking, the jurisprudence prior to the
Children’s Act has been reasonably well traversed27 and
the following factors highlighted as relevant to judicial
decision-making in the context of relocation: contact
17 Note 14 above.
18 491B-D.
19 P Lenta ‘Taking diversity seriously: Religious associations and work-related discrimination’ [2009] SALJ 827 at p833.
20 R.Malherbe ‘The constitutional dimension of the best interests of the child as applied in education’ [2008] TSAR 267 at p280.
21 H. Botes and A. Mji ‘Language diversity in the mathematics classroom: does a learner companion make a difference?’ [2010] South African
Journal of Education 123 at p124.
22 E. Bonthuys ‘Clean breaks, custody and parents right to relocate’ [2000] 26 SAJHR 489.
23 Bonthuys (note 22 above) at p 489.
24 Bonthuys (note 22 above) at p 490 relying on Shawzin v Laufer 1968 4 SA 657 (A).
25 See also L. Albertus ‘Relocation disputes: has the long and winding road come to an end? A South African perspective’ [2010] Speculum Juris 70.
26 C.J. Davel and A. Boniface ‘Cross border relocation of children and custodial parent: Jackson v Jackson 2002 2 SA 303 SCA’ [2003] THRHR 139.
27 Bonthuys (note 22 above) at p 486; J.M. Kruger ‘Immigration by a custodial parent after divorce’ [2001] THRHR 452; G.M. Barrie ‘The approach
of the courts regarding South African custodian parents going into the diaspora’ [2008] TSAR 571; A.M. Skelton ‘Child Law, The Child and South
African Private Law’ in C.J. Davel Child Law in South Africa [2009] Juta and Co at p88-90; B. van Heerden ‘Judicial Interference with the Parental
Power; The Protection of Children in Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family [1999] Juta and Co, Cape Town at p568. 
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with the non-primary caregiver, the child’s relationship
with the primary caregiver, any conflict between the
parents, the bona fides of the primary caregiver (reasons
for emigrating), the need for stability, the children’s
preferences and the relationship with new family
members.28 Kruger adds to this list as a separate factor
the ‘fundamental rights of the custodian parent’, which
would include such constitutionally protected rights as
the right to freedom of movement (s 21(1) of the South
African Constitution), the right to leave the Republic (s
21(2)), not to mention the right to freedom of association
and dignity rights.   Barrie makes more explicit the
‘requirement’, if it can be termed such, that the ‘reasons’
must be grounded in ‘reality, that is, they must be
concrete rather than comprising ‘wish lists’’.  Maternal
preference as a basis for decisions involving care of
children has diminished considerably in recent times.
Indeed, any evident bias towards mothers who are
primary care-givers is now eschewed by courts.31
A brief discussion of cases decided before the
commencement of the Children’s Act now follows, in an
attempt to illustrate the extent to which factors such as
culture, language and religion were considered in their
respective contexts.  
In Shawzin v Laufer,32 one of the main arguments
raised by the appellant (father) was that the children’s
standard of living would not be as high in Canada as it is
in South Africa. A higher standard of living did not carry
much weight. It was said by Rumpff, JA:   
‘I do not think that to be able to live in affluence
is of educative value to boys of that age; their
education and happiness in these formative
years depend, or should depend, on other things
in life’.33
Another concern of the appellant was that his
children would not be brought up in the atmosphere of
the Jewish faith if relocation was allowed. The
respondent (mother) assured the court that the children
will have proper religious training including the
observance of religious holidays and the Sabbath; her
current husband was also fluent in Hebrew.34 The
religious factors do not appear to have been considered
further, nor were they material in the context of the best
interests of the child test which was applied to grant the
relocation application.   
In Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen35 the applicant sought
the court’s consent to relocate to Australia permanently;
her support system – parents and siblings – being located
there. Her financial position was poor, and her
employment opportunities would allegedly be better in
Australia- her being a foreigner and unable to speak
Afrikaans resulted in her not being able to find
employment in South Africa. 
The court acknowledged that the children’s lives
having been disrupted by the divorce would be further
disrupted by the limited contact they would have with
their father should the court grant consent. Their mother
would, however, be equipped to cope and assist the
children with the initial difficulties they may
experience.36 Although the children would have to
adapt to a new culture, the court was satisfied that they
would have the necessary support structures to assist in
coping with the change.
In Godbeer v Godbeer,37 the applicant mother
adduced her status as a single mother, being fearful of
driving at night and being anxious of her children’s well-
being when they were alone at home. These concerns,
she alleged, would magnify in nature as the girls grew
older and became more socially active. The Court
allowed the application to the United Kingdom (UK),
28 Bonthuys (note 22 above) 490-499.
29 Kruger (note 27 above) 457.
30 Barrie (note 27 above) 571.
31 van der Linde v van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O); van Pletzen v van Pletzen 1998 (4) SA 95 (O).
32 1968 (4) SA 657 (A). .
33 669A-B.
34 660C-G.
35 1999 (4) SA 435 (C).
36 Before granting the application for relocation, King, DJP stated: ‘I trust that it will be recognised and accepted by both parents that there is no
winner and no loser in this matter; there are two concerned parents each seeking what is best for the children; a Court can only lay down the rules,
the parents must see that they are observed’ (at 441C- D).
37 2000 (3) SA 976 (W).
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citing the stable job environment to which the mother
would proceed, her ‘at least average’ earnings there, and
the plan to live in ‘acceptable surroundings’ close to a
school. Although a slightly lower standard of living might
ensue, the Court noted that ‘the composites of life are
manifold and other things might fall to be balanced
against that’.38
In Schutte v Jacobs39 the applicant sought an order
which would allow her to relocate to Botswana with her
child, aged four and a half. She sought such order as her
partner had been transferred to Botswana for work
purposes. The evidence indicated that suitable
arrangements were or would be made in future regarding
the accommodation, schooling and church membership
of the child. That the child was only four and a half  would
also not result in a serious disruption in her life as she
had not yet started primary school, and would easily
adapt to a new environment.40
F v F41 further illustrates pessimism about life in
South Africa. Indeed it was alleged by the applicant in
the lower court that the quality of life in Gotherinton,  in
the UK (to which she wished to relocate) was better than
in South Africa. The crime rate in South Africa was
unacceptable and she was living in an area constantly
patrolled by armed guards. She averred that the social
security system in the United Kingdom was better and
that the standard of schools in South Africa was
deteriorating and had not kept pace with international
standards.42
In this case, the court was swayed by the vague
nature of the custodian parent’s plans which were, in
short, fluid: by the time the matter went to oral evidence,
she had only secured a temporary low-paying job in the
UK. There was uncertainty about her employment
prospects, aftercare for the child, and a variety of other
long-term issues relevant to the child’s future.43 In
summary, the applicant’s motives were indeed relevant,
however, her implementation prognosis of those
intentions was insufficiently concrete and certain to
warrant dislodging the status quo in South Africa. It was
this that provided the major objection to the application
to relocate: indeed the Court left open the possibility of
a different verdict were more solid evidence to be placed
before a court at a later stage of the minutiae of the
planned move. This signals that the court neither
accepted nor rejected the claims that a safer and
educationally more advantageous environment obtained
in the UK as factors which could influence their decision.
In H v R44 the reasons for wishing to relocate were
employment opportunities as well as the high crime rate
in South Africa, the uncertain state of the economy, the
overburdened social services in South Africa, the limited
opportunities for white male South Africans and the
impact of HIV in South Africa. The applicant, who had
remarried, had, however, found good schools in the UK
and ‘done her research’. Despite the father’s very close
bond with the child and the excellent education
opportunities for both schooling and higher learning in
South Africa, his objections were overruled. The main
reasons were the fact that the relocating parent had
carefully considered the move and done everything
possible to ensure that minimum disruption to the child’s
relationship with his father would ensue. The order of the
Court reflected considerable detail as to the form and
shape of such future contact. 
In general terms, the leading South African case is
Jackson v Jackson.45 The applicant (custodial parent) was
the father of two girls aged 7 and 9½. He brought an
action for leave to remove the children from South Africa
to Australia. Such leave was granted by the trial court of
first instance, but was overturned by the full court of the
Natal Provincial Division. An appeal against this latter
decision was lodged with the Supreme Court of Appeal.
In examining the factors relevant to the decision as to
whether it was in the best interests of the children to
emigrate to Australia, Cloete AJA focused on the
38 At 980H.
39 (Nr 1) 2001 (2) SA 470 (W).
40 476E-F. It should be noted that the court required certain matters to be investigated further by the Family Advocate before a decision was made.
The application was however granted in Schutte v Jacobs (Nr 2) 2001 (2) SA 478 (W).
41 (2006) 1 All SA 571 (SCA).
42 Barrie (note 27 above) 568. 
43 At 579 (20)–(21). 
44 2001 (3) SA 623 (C). 
45 2002 (2) SA 303 (SCA).
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following: the custodial parent (appellant in the Supreme
Court of Appeal) in responding to the trial court’s
questions had stated that in his opinion, people in
Brisbane were happier and safer than in South Africa and
that specifically in Durban things had become worse;
that people in South Africa were depressed and had
forgotten how to have fun; that children (like his two
girls) were suppressed and could not lead a normal life as
he did as a child; and that South Africans had become
burdened with crime, AIDS, education problems and
health care problems that would be passed on to his
children. Such factors, he concluded, convinced him that
it would be in the best interests of his children to move
to Australia. These statements are quoted at length in
the reported SCA judgment, and, in the words of Cloete
AJA (who penned a separate judgment), were not
disputed. 
Scott, JA, for the majority, did not detail the impact of
‘crime free’ Australia in so many words, other than to
note that:
‘Although it would suit him to live in Australia,
his principal reason for wishing to emigrate was
his conviction that Australia was a better
country in which to bring up children and that it
was in their best long term interests that they
make Australia their home rather than remain
in South Africa’.46
In the event, the decision did not turn on the relative
merits of Australia versus South Africa as a destination,
but of course, on the relationship between the children
and their non-custodial mother, and the effects of the
envisaged separation upon that. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the attractions of Australia were relevant as to the
motive of the parent wishing to relocate.  
Marais, AJA, for the minority, made the following
point about ‘country comparisons’:
‘The reluctance of the Courts to make or to be
seen to be making findings of fact which may
reflect adversely about the quality of life in the
countries in which they are situated is entirely
understandable. It is an invidious task. However,
if they are to do their duty by children whose
future is in their hands, it is, in my respectful
view, an obligation which cannot be avoided if
that quality of life is the dominant reason
advanced for the contention that it would be in
their best interests to emigrate…’47. 
However, the learned judge did note that the
comparison made between South Africa and Australia
did not relate to trivial things, but to aspects of life which
are critical and fundamentally important to the growth
and development of healthy, happy and stress-free
children.48
It can be asserted that culturally speaking, Australia
and South Africa might be regarded as quite similar for
certain groups of the South African population as regards
lifestyle, educational standing and so forth. Some might
question whether ‘quality of life’ issues are relevant to
‘culture’ at all. This point is addressed in conclusion.
On balance, the leading cases reviewed here
demonstrate that language, culture and or religion were
not central to determining the best interests of the child
in the period before the Children’s Act. 
4  Culture, Language and Religion in the
Children’s Act
The main features of the Children’s Act that affect
relocation concern section 7 (the best interests of the
child), section 10 (child participation) and the new rules
concerning parental rights and responsibilities, which,
seen as a whole, replace the common law concepts
related to parental authority (access and custody).
Section 11 (dealing with the rights of children with
disabilities) has also assumed some relevance with
regard to relocation. As a general proposition, children’s
rights to language, religion and culture feature
particularly strongly in the Children’s Act, as will be
apparent from some examples cited below.
Cases are only now emerging in which the real impact
of the Children’s Act is coming to the fore.49 It cannot be
said, at this relatively early stage, that the Act has had a
46 320A.
47 325H-I.
48 325J-326A.
49 The principal sections dealt with in this article came into force on 1 July 2007. These include the chapter on children’s rights (chapter 2) and
the chapter on parental responsibilities and rights (chapter 3). The remainder of the Act, with its accompanying Regulations and Forms, was put
into effect on 1 April 2010. Judges and lawyers alike took a while to cotton on to the newly operationalised sections on parental responsibilities
and rights, which to some extent explains the relative lack of contemporary jurisprudence on the new provisions.
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major impact from the case law perused. However, the
Act could be the locus of quite a shift in emphasis in
future, as will now be explained.
The starting point for discussion is section 7, which
enshrines the South African equivalent of the so-called
‘welfare checklist’.50 However, as might be expected,
the adaption of the checklist to South African exigencies
is apparent.51 Section 7 contains a long list – more than
fourteen subsections in all – of factors which comprise
the best interests of the (South African) child. Two of the
most prominent in the context of relocation concern the
nature of the personal relationship between the child and
the parents or any specific parent and the child and any
other caregiver or person relevant in those circumstances
(section 7(1)(a)); and the attitude of the parents or any
specific parent, towards the child and the exercise of
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of that child
(7(1)(b)). However, relocation features more directly
than this: for instance, it is now a legal principle that
consideration be given to: 
‘the likely effect on the child of any change in
the child’s circumstances, including the likely
effect on the child of any separation from –
(i) both or either of the parents; or
(ii) any brother or sister or other child or any
other care-giver or person, with whom the child
has been living’ (section 7(1)(d)).
Here we find not only explicit mention of the wider
family circle (a notable feature of the Act as a whole
insofar as the extended African family kinship system
acquires legislative recognition in a variety of different
ways), but also reference to the interests of other
siblings, which must include the siblings attached to
newly-formed family units (as is evident from the phrase
‘any other child’).52
This line of thinking is reinforced by section 7(1)(f)
which explicates the principle of the 
‘need for the child – 
(i)To remain in the care of his or her parent,
family and extended family; and 
(ii) To maintain a connection with his or her
family, extended family, culture or tradition’53
as factors to be taken into account in determining the
child’s best interests. These, as we have seen, had not
surfaced explicitly in relocation case law hitherto.
Another factor which warrants consideration in this
analysis is that contained in section 7(1)(e), insofar as it
brings the practical difficulty and expense associated
with maintaining ‘personal relations and direct contact’
with the parents or any specific parent on a regular basis
directly to bear. In short, independent of the personal
relationship between child and either parent (section 7
(1)(a)) and their capacity to provide for the needs of the
child, including the child’s emotional and intellectual
needs (section 7(1)(c)), a range of other relevant and
relocation-oriented  considerations are now statutorily
relevant.
Section 7(1)(h) is thus not irrelevant, insofar as it
speaks of  the need to consider ‘the child’s physical and
emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional,
social and cultural development’ (emphasis inserted).. A
particular feature of the Act is its sensitive treatment of
disability and this is emphasised in a variety of different
areas of legislative concern. Not least of these is  section
11 (which falls in the overarching chapter dealing with
children’s rights) in which it is stated that due
consideration must be given to striving for certain
outcomes if a matter concerns a child with a disability, to
be achieved in ways spelt out in this particular article.54
It must be stated that it appears at first glance that
50 The leading discussion on the Children’s Act (C,J. Davel and A.M. Skelton, Commentary on the Children’s Act [2007] Juta and Co, Cape Town)
does not dissect the contents of the checklist in section 7 in minute detail.
51 For instance, the Australian Family Law Act of 1975 from which this provision is clearly derived is, on the face it, quite similar: yet two substantive
differences can be discerned: the Australian variant does not expressly refer to brothers and sisters as are alluded to in section 7(1)(d) (but only to
‘any other child’), nor does the Australian Family Law Act mention ‘care-givers’. Care-givers occupy a very special place in the Children’s Act overall,
in recognition of the large numbers of children being raised by persons who are not biological mothers (for instance). Hence care-givers can even,
in some instances, consent to medical treatment and to HIV testing, a necessary development given the HIV aids pandemic in South Africa. 
52 The intention of this article was also to give practical effect to the CRC and ACRWC presumptions against separation of children from their
families: article 9 CRC and article 25 ACRWC.
53 Emphasis inserted. The Australian Family Law Act 1975 refers to the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Island culture of the child, though there are also
references generally to children’s lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions): section 60(3)(h).
54 Providing the child with parental care, family care of special care as and where appropriate; making it possible for the child to participate in
social, cultural, religious and educational activities, recognising the special needs that the child may have; providing the child with conditions that
ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate active participation in the community; and providing the child and the child’s caregiver with the
necessary support services; section 11(1)(a)-(d).
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the principles in section 7 function independently of each
other: that is, they may ‘weigh in’ separately from factors
such as the personal relationship a child has with either
parent (section 7(1)(a)), and the capacity of parents to
provide for the child’s needs (section 7(1)(c)). This reading
is reinforced by a textual analysis, as the subsections of
section 7 are not linked with the word ‘and’. However,
the fact that each principle counts independently does
not entail rejecting the approach of the court in AC v
KC,55 discussed in more detail in section 4 of this article.
Parenting plans are a new feature introduced by the
Children’s Act,56 in an effort to encourage disputing
parents to work out their differences in an orderly
manner. Indeed, the Act seeks to prevent litigation from
ensuing by requiring parties to first seek to agree on a
parenting plan in some situations57,  if needs be with the
assistance of a social worker, psychologist or family
advocate, or after mediation.
The contents of a parenting plan are not detailed in
any way in the Act, nor do the Regulations provide
further enlightenment.58 However, it is worth recording
that in providing examples of what may be included in a
parenting plan (s 33 specifies that a parenting plan may
determine any matter in connection with parental
responsibilities and rights), and apart from providing the
child with a place to live and maintaining contact with
the child, the Act makes mention of only two further
incidents of parental responsibility, namely: the
schooling and the religious upbringing of the child.59
The legislature was alive to the difficulties occasioned
by child rearing in a multi-cultural and multi-religious
society where schooling-related issues frequently
provide the fulcrum for disputes about culture. As will be
shown briefly in conclusion, ‘schooling’ is for many South
Africans a pseudonym for language and heritage claims,
or, seen differently, a roundabout way of alluding to
culture in practical terms. 
In the next section we undertake a brief discussion of
relocation cases since the advent of the Children’s Act.
These focus only on case law where language (and
implicitly, culture) or religion surfaced. 
5  The impact of the Children’s Act
In K v K60 the relocation was sought by a father
wishing to go to Israel where his parents and sisters lived,
and where he was born. He averred that his daughter
would enjoy a better education in Israel, and there is
some suggestion that the application for relocation was
motivated by a robbery during which the applicant’s
current wife and the child for whom the order was sought
were held at gunpoint at the home of the applicant,
which left the child traumatised.61
However, the future plans of the applicant appeared
to be uppermost in the mind of the court: 
‘It appears that if she goes to Israel that L will be
attending a school where the classes will be
given in Hebrew. It is not in dispute that L does
not speak Hebrew. The applicant in reply says
that L is attending Hebrew lessons and that the
Israeli Immigration Department and the Modiin
Municipality provide intensive Hebrew study
programmes to facilitate integration into the
community and the country. No detail is
provided of either of the programmes nor is any
detail provided of how L is coping with her
Hebrew lessons. Whilst it is probable that L
would eventually learn sufficient Hebrew to
enable her to communicate it is not possible to
determine how long this would take nor what
effect her inability to speak Hebrew would have
on her school career. It is self-evident that if she
cannot speak Hebrew, which is the language of
55 (A389/08) [2008] ZAGPHC 369 (13 June 2008).
56 Sections 33 and 34, read with sections 30 and 31 and the Regulations promulgated on 1 April 2010.
57 Section 33(2) provides that ‘ [i]f the co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child are experiencing difficulties in
exercising their responsibilities and rights, those persons, before seeking the intervention of a court, must first seek to agree on a parenting plan
determining the exercise of their respective responsibilities and rights in respect of the child’.
58 This is in contrast to earlier versions of the Regulations and Forms which contained a pro forma parenting plan: the author of this article was
the main contractor who drafted the Regulations for Government.
59 Section 33(3)(d).
60 (17189/08) [2009] ZAGPJHC13 (6 May 2009).
61 With some irony, the court continues to point out that ‘since the robbery appears to be an isolated incident and no further incident has occurred
since January 2008’. The applicant provides no details of the incidents of crime in the area in which he lives, nor is there any detail provided of crime
statistics in Modiin. As pointed out by the Judge, the applicant simply ignores the fact that Israel is in a constant state of war with the Palestinians
or its neighbours...! at p 14-15 (17.7).
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instruction, that this could have a detrimental
effect on her schooling. No detail has been
provided of whether L will be able to integrate
socially and culturally in Israel. In particular
whether she will be able to make friends in
Israel having regard to the language barrier’.62
As a result the Court was not in a position to
determine whether it would be in the child’s best
interests that she be removed from her school and
friends in South Africa. Although the child expressed the
view that she wished to emigrate to Israel as it would
take away hurtful memories and solve her problems, the
Court felt that her views were naïve and unrealistic and
could not be decisive. The Court  held that she was not of
an age to appreciate the effects of a removal her from
her established friends and familiar school and
surroundings and then being thrust into a foreign
environment, where she does not speak the language
required for schooling or social activities. Furthermore,
no assessment had been made regarding the suitability
of the child to be educated in a language that she could
not speak.63 The necessary permission to relocate was
therefore not granted.
AC v KC64 provides another recent example. The
applicant mother (who was successful in the court a quo,
and who was therefore the respondent on appeal) was a
cytologist who had received an attractive contract offer
(for three years) to work in Abu Dhabi. The applicant had
a job in South Africa, but the job offer to which she was
attracted was reportedly destined to pay three times as
much, once tax breaks and allowances were added.
The children had been schooled in Afrikaans, and one
assumes from this that Afrikaans was their mother
tongue. Nevertheless, the oldest child (aged about 10-
11) was a ‘top 10’ learner and was ‘proficient in English’.
The second child, aged about 9-10, was an average
learner with a concentration problem. Both children
attended an Afrikaans medium school.  The children were
obviously not able to be educated in Arabic, but the plan
was to attend an American English medium school in Abu
Dhabi, with Arabic as a subject. Afrikaans would clearly
not be part of the curriculum. 
The report by the Family Advocate, the statutory
authority with the responsibility to provide the Court
with an assessment of the best interests of the child,65
contained reservations about the younger child, citing
his ‘possible problems with education through the
medium of English’ given his learning problems. 
The appellant raised concerns regarding the lack of
information concerning the respondent’s financial
position generally, the education of the children, the
possible problems relating to where they would live, and
whether the court was in a position to make a
determination about all the aspects in section7 of the
Children’s Act. He alleged that her decision was bona fide
but not reasonable, and complained that the lower court
did not deal ‘with all the aspects that the legislature
regarded as important as contained in section 7’66. 
However, the court was informed that there was quite
a large Afrikaans community in Abu Dhabi as well as an
Afrikaans church, from which one can discern an
intention on the part of the respondent to maintain
cultural ties.
With reference to the section 7 checklist,
Hartzenberg, J opined that the court had to take an
overall view of the situation: 
‘...it is not like marking a mathematics test
where the score is counted and one can see
whether the candidate has passed ... it is more
like marking an essay where one reads it and
takes cognisance of the contents thereof and
then makes a value judgment to decide on the
mark that is to be given...’.67
We deduce that the approach is not to take each
aspect of section 7 seriatim and tick them off, as it were,
but obviously, equally, the factors enumerated in section
7 which now constitute the legislative embodiment of
the child’s best interests cannot be ignored or
62 11-12 (17.1).  
63 15 (18).
64 (A389/08) [2008] ZAGPHC 369 (13 June 2008).
65 The Office of the Family Advocate was created by the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987. 
66 par 9.
67 Par 11.
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overlooked. The impression obtained is that a composite
approach is what is required, and a weighing up of all the
relevant factors elaborated in section 7 will suffice.  
Stating that:
‘if the bread winner gets a job offer which looks
as if it would be to the advantage of the family,
usually it will be accepted....’. 68
the court premised its final decision virtually
exclusively on the reasonableness of the applicant’s
decision and motives. The court quaintly reminisced
about the bonus paterfamilias or reasonable man (sic)...
who is ‘not a timorous faint-heart... but on the
contrary… ventures out into the world, engages in affairs
and takes reasonable chances’.69 But the further
educational and cultural ‘fit’ of the proposed move for
the children received barely a mention. It is thus obvious
that the appeal court was swayed by the perceived
advantages of the move, which sounded almost purely
in money. Economic betterment of the parent’s position,
it must be concluded, was the primary rationale for
allowing the relocation.70
One could argue that the children’s cultural needs
would be catered for because of the Afrikaans
community in Abu Dhabi, but no mention is made of the
support structures that would be in place to assist the
younger child to cope with his educational and
intellectual needs - as is clearly required by the Children’s
Act. 
Cunningham v Pretorius71 saw an application for
relocation to Austin, Texas. A remarriage and new life
with the reconstituted family was at stake.72 The child’s
mother tongue was Afrikaans, and it was common cause
that even at the age of four, a significant ‘backlog’
existed: he could be said to have a ‘language disability’.73
He struggled with Afrikaans and as a result, it could be
inferred that section 11(1) of the Children’s Act was of
application; it will be recalled that this section concerns
the rights of children with disabilities and requires that
the child be provided with appropriate care within the
family and community, making it possible for the child
to actively participate in sound cultural, religious and
educational activities in such a way as to promote the
child’s dignity, self-reliance and active participation. 
The Afrikaans language problem notwithstanding,
according to one expert report, the child appeared more
comfortable speaking English, chose to play with English
speaking children and understood English instructions
better than Afrikaans. However, another expert was of
the view that schooling in a second language could pose
a barrier to the child’s learning, on the basis that
language is a significant predictor of academic success
overall.74
It was contended by the applicant that the child
would benefit from a better education system and
superior facilities in Texas. However, the respondent
argued that it would not be in the best interests of the
child to be schooled in English, when he had not yet
mastered his first language.75
The issue did not seem to revolve around language as
a method of communication with the left-behind parent,
68 Par 12.
69 Par 13.
70 This decision has been criticised by one of the authors in Albertus (note 25 above). She argues that the ‘reasonable man’ test should not have
been allowed to displace the best interests of the child, as seems to have occurred. Further that the allegations of the appellant father that related
to the second child’s emotional and intellectual needs should have been properly addressed; and, at minimum, due consideration should have been
given to the child being provided with support systems whilst abroad. Finally, she points out that ‘although appropriate weight should be attached
to the primary caregiver’s interests, courts must guard against the assumption that a decision taken by the primary care-giver is equivalent to the
child’s best interests as was emphasised in F v F (2006) 1 All SA 571 (SCA) at 577(13)’.
71 (31187/08) [2008] ZAGPHC 258 (21 August 2008).
72 Interestingly, the father alluded to his new family - a new sibling was on the way – but this was regarded only as a potential vehicle providing
him with comfort in the absence of the relocating child! The implications for the child of the removal away from his siblings in section 7(1)(d), noted
above, were not explored. In B v M [2006] 3 All SA 109 (W), the applicant (mother) had remarried and wished to relocate to Cape Town as a result
of her current husband being offered a once in a lifetime opportunity in his field of expertise. One of the factors taken into account in determining
the best interests of the children was their relationship with their half-brother (born of the mother and her current husband). In fact, the court held
that as upper guardian of the half-brother, his best interests also needed to be considered in the application. This approach more readily
approximates the stance we advocate of considering independently each of the factors in section 7, insofar as they are relevant to a particular case. 
73 Reports from an educational psychologist, speech therapists, social workers and other were presented: six reports in all.
74 16-17 (26).
75 17-18 (27).
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but rather the more abstract notion of language as a
learning medium generally.76 The judge was extremely
sensitive to the child’s language needs: 
‘…whether it is an intrinsic developmental
deficit or a product of his present acrimonious
environment, all of the options he faces will
pose additional challenges.....whichever way it
goes... will impact on his language and
intellectual development. The relatively
privileged environment to which he will move
in Texas, the equal if not superior support
systems likely to be on offer there, as well as his
mother’s adaptable, focussed and efficient
character lead me to believe that his disability,
if it is indeed such, will be adequately managed
in Texas with dignity and in a manner promoting
his ultimate self reliance’77.  
It is axiomatic that the application was granted. It
could be argued as the child was young, it would not
have an unduly adverse effect on him if his mother
tongue were to be forgotten and his culture (possibly)
lost altogether. In the Zulu boy case, the child’s culture
was as foreign to him as the country itself by the time he
returned.  The Pillay case78 sets international standards
in recognising the child’s right to practice her religion,
and it is to be questioned whether courts would adopt
the same position with regard to a child’s culture or
language, more especially where a young child is
concerned. However, if the child is of an age where his
culture has been ingrained, then such factor should be
considered in detail by our courts.  
6  Analysis and Conclusions
First, the discussion above has revealed an uneven
pattern in which culture and language (in particular) have
been brought to the fore in relocation cases. Religion has
played a marginal role thus far and has not been central
to the courts’ inquiry. The reason for this could be that
where religion became a point of concern, the applicant
had indicated that the child would continue to practice
his/her religion. 
Second, in the majority of cases where language and
culture were raised in relation to proposed relocation
applications, these were raised in opposition to the
relocation. Therefore, it has only been in answer to the
opposing parent’s concern that courts have taken into
account language and cultural factors. 
Third, South African jurisprudence can be singled out
for the reason that the rights isolated for discussion in
this article are not mere principles of domestic law, but
find constitutional expression. Hence the right to
religion, for instance, is as much a right of the child as
any other: 
‘A necessary element of freedom and of dignity
of any individual is an ‘entitlement to respect
for the unique set of ends that the individual
pursues’.79
It is also said that:
‘Cultural identity if one of the most important
parts of a person’s identity precisely because it
flows from belonging to a community and not
from personal choice or achievement. And
belonging involves more than simple
association; it includes participation and
expression of the community’s practices and
traditions’. 80
It is argued that as culture, language and religion are
constitutional rights, they should be central to the
court’s enquiry in those instances where they are at
stake. After all, it is not the adaptability of the primary
caregiver in the foreign country or ex-home country that
is at issue, but that of the child. 
That brings out the fourth issue, namely the
continued dominance of parental interests in the actual
decisions of courts, even in the face of a newly enacted
charter which expressly sets out the interests of the
child.81 The conclusion is inescapable that the cultural
rights of the child are still regarded as inextricably bound
up in those of the relocating parent, and even mother-
tongue education rights have not dislodged that premise
76 If this is true, then language issues may be more relevant in relocation disputes involving younger children, as for older children, it may be argued
that their learning techniques and skills are ordinarily more assured.
77 43 (71).
78 Note 14 above.
79 MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) 496-497G.
80 493D-E.
81 It can be deduced that the central theme of child participation which runs through the Children’s Act is one that will yet play a role in influencing
relocation decisions.
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(provided the relocating parent’s plans are reasonably
clear and concrete).82
As for indigenous culture, of the Zulu variety referred to
in the introduction, it is apparent that the cases adduced
concern predominantly Afrikaans, and Xhosa, Sotho and
Pedi language rights (for instance) have not surfaced. This
may be a function of the socio-economic reality that
relocation applications must be pursued in the high cost
environment of the High Court, often only accessible to
‘high net worth’ English and Afrikaans speaking clients; but
it may also indicate that in the case of other South African
indigenous peoples - that is, in the case of other language
groups - it is perceived to be inevitable that children will be
exposed to multiple languages during their youth. It is
even possible that for language groups other than English
and Afrikaans, exposure to new languages is seen as an
asset and not a liability. 
A further possibility is that that Afrikaans language
speakers identify language with the preservation of their
culture and heritage in a way that is different from other
language speakers, which then also explains why the
language policy of schools has been hotly contested in
South African jurisprudence.
Sixth, a note on ‘culture’, crime and HIV: earlier cases
discussed in this article evince a strong ‘cultural’
argument that life in other culturally similar countries,
including the UK and Australia, may be preferable to
growing up in South Africa. Indeed, South African
emigrants (and others) refer quite frequently to the
culture of crime, the dropping of educational standards,
the prevalence of HIV/Aids and other ills of this society.
However, these are not truly cultural factors, as
constitutionally understood, and simply pertain to
parental motivation. Thus, these concerns should not be
considered under section 7 of the Children’s Act, unless
they relate to the need to protect the child from physical
or psychological harm (section 7(1)(l)) or the ‘child’s need
for development and to engage in play and other
recreational activities appropriate to the child’s age’
(section 6(2)(e) which falls under the heading ‘General
Principles’).
However, in a country which lacks a comprehensive
social security system to provide for workers who lose
their jobs, or persons who are unemployed, the realities
of employment opportunities abroad for the parent who
wishes to relocate, or his or her partner, cannot be
underestimated, nor can the economic imperatives be
dealt with on the same basis as they may be in
jurisdictions where there is a safety net for non-working
care-givers. And in a country where the child
maintenance system has been sorely tested through
chronic non-payment of child support by parents,83 we
would argue that a parent’s need to provide economic
support for a child must weigh heavily against the child’s
right to culture, religion and language. 
Finally, it has been asserted in this article that the
major change that the Children’s Act as whole has
brought about is the child-focussed nature of the enquiry
that is required: no longer can relocation be approached
solely from the basis of the vantage point of the parents.
It is recommended that in those instances where
language, culture and religion are at stake, courts should
be conscious of these rights being diminished as a
consequence of relocation. These factors should
independently form part of the balancing process to
determine the best interests of the child, especially if the
child is of school going age and his or her culture, religion
and language is established.84
82 The primary caregiver’s need, for example, to return to her home country; accompany her new spouse; or career opportunities are always
mentioned first. Then comes the reassurance that the child’s educational needs will either be of a higher standard or adequately provided for. 
83 Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC).
84 J. Heaton ‘An individualized contextualized and child centre determination of the child bests interests, and the implications of such an approach
in the South African Context’ [2009] TSAR 1 at 14 agrees that ‘in view of our constitutional values of tolerance of and respect for diversity and
pluralism, the child’s best interests must be determined in a manner that takes cognizance of and is sensitive to culture and religion. Like all other
factors, culture and religion must be viewed in a child centre manner. The focus should be the role that culture and religion play in the child’s life.’
